The answers are not provided by just anybody but by language researchers themselves. Before they are put on the web they get checked by another researcher and they get translated into German, Dutch and English. It’s a huge enterprise, to be sure..
As an employee of the Max Planck Institute I’ve had my own go at answering a few questions:
A rather recent addition to laws designed to reduce these numbers was the adoption of compulsory hands-free devices for mobile phones. Their safety value is easy to understand. When you look at a mobile phone display you cannot simultaneously look at the road. Similarly, using your hands for typing and using them for steering are at least partly incompatible actions.
How mobile phone use impairs sight and hands.
From a psychological point of view the current law tries to ensure that visual input channels (eyes) and motor output channels (hands) remain undisturbed. But what about the brain areas which control these channels?
This is the question recently investigated by Bergen from UC San Diego and colleagues. They put undergraduates in a driving simulator giving the impression of a motorway with steady traffic and a car in front of the driver breaking from time to time. Simultaneously, the driver had to judge simple true/false statements from the motor domain (e.g., “To open a jar, you turn the lid counterclockwise.”), the visual domain (e.g., “The letters on a stop sign are white.”), or the abstract domain (e.g., “The capital of North Dakota is Bismarck.”). As a baseline condition, people were just asked to say “true” or “false” several times.
Why choose such questions? There is both behavioural and brain-imaging evidence that language comprehension involves the simulation of what was said. This set of findings is often summarised as embodied cognition and its take-home message is something like this: in order to understand it, you mentally do it. For example, to answer a motor question, you use your brain areas doing motor control and make them simulate what it would be like to open a jar. Based on the outcome of this simulation you answer the question.
So, will visual or motor questions affect driving differently than abstract questions because the former engage the same brain areas as those needed for driving while the latter don’t? The alternative would be that asking anything distracts because general attention gets pulled away from driving.
The results go both ways. First, one measure was affected by the true/false statements but not by which kinds: quickly breaking when the car in front breaks. The time it took to do so was longer if any sort of question was asked compared to baseline. This suggests that domain general mechanisms were interfered with through language, e.g., attention.
Was she a safe driver? May depend on whether she talked and if so about what.
Second, one measure was affected by what kind of statements had to be judged:generally holding a safe distance to other cars. This distance was greater if visual questions were asked compared to abstract questions and compared to baseline. A similar, albeit not as clear, pattern emerged for motor questions. It looks as if participants were so distracted by these kinds of questions that they fell behind their optimal driving distance. This suggests that a task such as keeping a safe driving distance which requires visual working memory (compare ideal distance to actual distance) and corrective motor responses (bring ideal and actual distances closer together) is influenced by language comprehension through mental simulation.
On the one hand, the scientific implications are quite straight forward. Bergen and colleague’s results suggest that those low level perception and action control areas which are needed for quick reactions are not what embodied cognition is about. Instead it seems like embodied cognition happens in higher perceptual and motor planning areas. Furthermore, the whole embodied cognition idea gets quite a boost from a conceptual replication under relatively realistic conditions.
On the other hand, the practical implications are somewhat controversial. Because talking in general impairs quick reactions by the driver, even hands-free devices pose a risk. This danger is compounded by talking about abstract topics since the driving distance is reduced compared to visual topics.
The authors refrain from saying that any sort of conversation should be prohibited. Passengers share perceptual experiences with the driver and can adjust their conversations to the dangerousness of the situation. Mobile phone contacts can’t do this. But what if you want to be really really safe? Well, cut your own risk of dying and take public transport. There you can chat and cut your death risk by 90% (bus) or even 95% (train or flight) compared to car travel (EU numbers).
A safe way to travel.
Bergen, B., Medeiros-Ward, N., Wheeler, K., Drews, F., & Strayer, D. (2012). The Crosstalk Hypothesis: Why Language Interferes With Driving. Journal of experimental psychology. General PMID: 22612769
1) By Ed Brown as Edbrown05 (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-2.5 (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5)], via Wikimedia Commons
This may be a completely obvious statement if it wasn’t for what it entails. First of all, words have to be pronounced. Secondly, words carry meaning. Both properties change how words are used. A bunch of studies has recently shown that these properties also influence how the people behind names are perceived. In essence, names open up the door for biases, misperceptions and prejudices.
Be careful, if your name happens to be MohammedVougiouklakis you may not like what you’re about to read.
Firstly, pronunciation is important. If a word is unpronounceable, it never enters a community’s language. Turns out people whose names are unpronounceable also have trouble in the community. Laham and colleagues (2012) asked Australian undergraduates to rate how good a fictional local council candidate was. Participants read a fake local news article which was always the same except for the surname of the candidate which was either difficult to pronounce (Vougiouklakis, Leszczynska) or easy (Lazaridis, Paradowska). Easy to pronounce candidates were rated better.
In another experiment, Laham and colleagues looked at the hierarchy within real US American law firms. Pronounceability was associated with the lawyer’s position in the firm’s hierarchy. This was found even just for the subset of names which were Anglo-American, likewise for the foreign name sample. So, the more easily pronounceable the name, the better your career prospects.
It is worth appreciating how weird this outcome is. People did not rate names but instead the people who carry the names. Furthermore, they had a wealth of information about them and one may think that name pronunciation is a very unimportant bit of information that is simply ignored. Nonetheless, even though it should be completely irrelevant for success name pronunciation appears to shape people’s lives.
Secondly, words have meaning. The most important meaning of a name is what it says about the community you are from. It signifies gender, ethnicity, race, region, etc. One widely known American study is Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2004) job application study in which real job adverts were answered with fake resumes only differing in terms of name. Black sounding names (Lakisha Washington) received less call-backs than white sounding names (Emily Walsh). Furthermore, application quality was not important for black sounding names while it did change call-back rates for white sounding names.
If you are from Europe (like me) and you feel like racism is oh so American (somewhat like me before I wrote this post), bear in mind that the main finding has been replicated with local ethnic minority names in many European countries:
If he is called Tobias (rather than Fatih) he gets 14% more call-backs on applications.
Britain – Muhammed Kalid vs. Andrew Clarke (Wood et al., 2009)
France – BakariBongo vs. JulienRoche (Cediey and Foroni, 2008)
Germany - Fatih Yildiz vs. TobiasHartmann (Kaas and Manger, 2011)
Greece – NikolaiDridanski vs. IoannisChristou (Drydakis and Vlassis, 2010)
Netherlands – Mohammed vs. Henk (Derous et al., 2012)
Ireland (McGinnity and Lunn, 2011)
Sweden – Ali Said vs. Erik Andersson (Carlsson and Rooth, 2007)
This is really just evidence for old fashioned discrimination in the job market. But it says more than that. In the American study, getting additional qualifications is worth it for whites while it did not have a significant impact on call-back rates for blacks. Thus, similarly to the pronunciation effect above, additional information does not reduce the effect of the obviously irrelevant name characteristics. Instead, in the case of Bertrand and Mullainathan’s study, additional information of application quality even exacerbated the race difference.
The take-home message is that people take in all sorts of objectively irrelevant information – like names – and use it to make their choices. These choices are more likely to go against you if your name is difficult to pronounce or foreign sounding. People make choices about names and these choices affect the people behind the names.
So, what is there to do? If you really want to treat people fairly, i.e. give people an equal chance independent of the names they were given or have chosen, give them a number. Because – and this will sound terribly obvious – numbers aren’t words.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination. The American Economic Review, 94(4), 991-1025. doi: 10.1257/0002828042002561
Carlsson, M., & Rooth, D.-O. (2007). Evidence of ethnic discrimination in the Swedish labor market using experimental data. Labour Economics, 14, 716–729. doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2007.05.001
Cediey, E., & Foroni, F. (2008). Discrimination in Access to Employment on Grounds of Foreign Origin in France. ILO International Migration Paper 85E, International Labour Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
Derous, E., Ryan, A.M., Nguyen, H.-H. D. (2012). Multiple categorization in resume screening: Examining effects on hiring discrimination against Arab applicants in field and lab settings. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 33, 544-570. doi: 10.1002/job.769
Drydakis, N., & Vlassis, M. (2010). Ethnic discrimination in the greek labour market: occupational access, insurance coverage and wage offers. The Manchester School, 78(3), 201–218. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02132.x
Kaas, L., & Manger, C. (2011). Ethnic Discrimination in Germany’s Labour Market: A Field Experiment. German Economic Review 13(1): 1–20.
Laham, S.M., Koval, P., Alter, A.L. (2012). The name-pronunciation effect: Why people like Mr. Smith more than Mr. Colquhoun. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(3), 752-756. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.12.002
And nonetheless, one can answer them. Crime can be a beast haunting local neighbourhoods and it must be eradicated – a description suggesting it is well and alive. And musical pitch is high or low.
Of course, these are all just metaphors useful for quickly talking about things without having to stop for lengthy definitions. However, they are not only linguistic short cuts. They are also mental short cuts – or opportunities for manipulation, if you prefer a more racy description. Last year, a bunch of studies showed examples of how far one can go with this.
A metaphorical breeding program.
Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) contrasted two common Western metaphors related to crime: the crime as a beast (preying on a town, lurking in the neighbourhood) and crime as a virus (infecting a town, plaguing the neighbourhood). They ‘activated’ these metaphors by using these words alongside fictional crime statistics of an unknown town. When participants were asked what to do about the town’s crime problem, those in the beast-condition were more likely to suggest law enforcement actions (capture, enforce, punish) than those in the virus-condition who often opted for reform-measures (diagnose, treat, inoculate).
Thus, a linguistic short-cut affected how people reacted to a realistic real world problem in the realm of social policy. And the effects are big. As one might expect, the same researchers also found political and gender differences (US Republicans as well as men tend to be more on the enforcement side than US Democrats/ Independents and women). Simply mentioning a metaphor was twice as powerful in shaping opinion than any of these variables.
A literally high pitch.
In a different set of studies, even something as basic as the height of a tone was shown to be metaphorical. Dolscheid and colleagues (2011) showed that when a tone is presented with an image of height (basically a vertical line crossed by another line at a high or low point) this influences Westerners’ pitch repetition – as would be expected by the pitch-as-height metaphor. When Dutch participants sang a tone paired with a high line, they tended to sing higher. An image of thickness (a thick or thin line) was without influence. The reverse was the case for Farsi speakers even though they lived in the same country. In Farsi, low tones are called thick and high tones are called thin. In a second step, the research team trained people for only 20 minutes with the thickness metaphor – without them knowing. Afterwards, Dutch people performed similarly to Farsi speakers who had known it all their lives.
The wider point is one I have made before: Language is not just for talking, it is also a window into the Mind. However, the metaphor research goes further by also showing how easily this window gives access to the Mind, how easily we can be manipulated. Something as important as how to address crime can be influenced by a recently encountered metaphor. The same applies to something as basic as singing back a tone.
And don’t say they can be spotted easily. Or did you notice the race metaphor written black on white at the beginning of this post?
What is so female about ships to call them she (LINK)? What is so neuter about children to call them it (LINK)? Now imagine that entire languages – like German, Spanish and French – are full of these arbitrary gender assignments, not allowing any genderless nouns. This has a profound effect on the way the mind works. A couple of articles published last year on the grammatical gender of nouns in different languages nicely illustrate this point.
To native speakers of gendered languages – i.e. languages whose nouns are all masculine, feminine or perhaps neuter – their language’s gender system usually appears obvious. I vividly remember sitting in France in a Philosophy class and the teacher elaborated on the female gender of life (la vie). According to her, life could only ever be feminine for some forgotten reason. When a class mate pointed out that life was neuter in German and, that, therefore, her reasoning was flawed she turned to me as a native German speaker. I could only agree with the comment and see her theory fall apart in real time (btw, life can even be masculine as for example in Bulgarian or Hebrew). This is the first experience which I can remember of a native speaker applying the mostly arbitrary grammatical gender system beyond the domain of language.
Recent research has found more examples of grammatical gender influencing how language users think about completely asexual things. In a very small experiment, an Israeli friend of mine (Rony Halevy) asked Hebrew speakers to dress up cutlery and other objects and found more feminine dresses on grammatically female items and vice versa for male items (see picture). Dutch controls, who do not distinguish between male and female grammatical gender, did not show a similar effect. Still, one may argue that the reference to gender was in the task already. Similarly, language based tasks in this field could be said to only reveal an effect of grammatical gender on other linguistic processes. So, can language really influence the mind in general?
Hebrew is a gendered language and participants tend to dress up simple objects such as a spoon or a fork according to their grammatical gender. The Dutch gender system does not refer to male and female and does not show the same effect. Data based on student project by Rony Halevy.
Cubelli et al. (2011) used a categorisation task in which participants had to quickly judge whether two pictures showed objects belonging to the same category or not. Judgements were faster if the objects’ grammatical gender matched. The authors interpreted this as showing that people access the words related to the pictures even when this is not required for the task.
Even outside the laboratory the effect can be shown. Sampling images from a big online art database, Segel and Boroditsky (2011) looked at all the gendered depictions of naturally asexual entities like love, justice, or time. Depicted gender agreed with grammatical gender in 78% of the cases. The effect was replicable for Italian, French and German. On top of that, it even held when only looking at those entities whose grammatical genders are conflicting in the studied languages.
It is worth reiterating that the aforementioned behaviours were completely non-linguistic. The grammatical gender system is just a set of rules for how words change when combined. The fact that people draw on these purely linguistic rules to perform unrelated tasks shows quite powerfully what a central role language plays in our minds.
But the effect may go further than that. In English, natural gender must be included in personal pronouns (he/she). Admittedly, there are exceptions (child – it) but they are rare. In Chinese, there is no such requirement. Personal pronouns can mark gender (written forms of ta) or not (spoken ta). Chen and Su (2011, Experiment 2) presented English or Chinese participants with written English or Chinese sentences which included gendered personal pronouns. Participants were asked to match each sentence to one of two pictures, each showing a person of a different gender. English speaking participants were faster and more accurate than Chinese speakers on these judgements. It’s as if English speakers are better trained in thinking about natural gender because English makes such thinking compulsory. Chinese participants, on the other hand, can produce pronouns without thinking of natural gender and, thus, have this information less readily available for their judgements.
One may argue that the effect relies on people of different native tongues showing different behaviours. These people probably differ in many ways other than their native language. Wider cultural differences could be invoked. Still, given that the effect holds for German, French, Italian, Spanish and Chinese, the most straightforward explanation indeed appears to be their language background. A way of overcoming the confounding influence of cultural upbringing may be to contrast second language learners of the same native language who learn different second languages.
Despite these short comings, the influence of the gender status of a language on the mind of its users is clearly measurable. This illustrates quite nicely that thought is influenced by what you must say – rather than by what you can say. This highlights that language is not an isolated skill but instead a central part of how our minds function. Studying language use is important – not just for the sake of language.
Chen, J-Y., & Su, J-J. (2011). Differential Sensitivity to the Gender of a Person by English and Chinese Speakers. Journal of Psycholinguist Research, 40, 195–203. doi: 10.1007/s10936-010-9164-9
Cubelli, R., Paolieri, D., Lotto, L., & Job, R. (2011). The Effect of Grammatical Gender on Object Categorization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 449–460. doi: 10.1037/a0021965
Segel, E., & Boroditsky, L. (2011). Grammar in art. Frontiers in Psychology, 1,1. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00244